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Abstract
Organized persuasive communication is essential to the exercise of power at national and global 
levels. It has been studied extensively by scholars of public relations, promotional culture and 
propaganda. There exists, however, considerable confusion and conceptual limitations across 
these fields: scholars of PR largely focus on what they perceive to be non-manipulative forms of 
organized persuasive communication; scholars of propaganda focus on manipulative forms but 
tend either to examine historical cases or non-democratic states; scholars of promotional culture 
focus on ‘salesmanship’ in public life. All approaches show minimal conceptual development 
concerning manipulative organized persuasive communication involving deception, incentivization 
and coercion. As a consequence, manipulative, propagandistic organized persuasive communication 
within liberal democracies is a blind spot; it is rarely recognized let alone researched with the result 
that our understanding and grasp of these activities is stunted. To overcome these limitations, we 
propose a new conceptual framework that theorizes precisely manipulative forms of persuasion, 
as well as demarcating what might count as non-manipulative or consensual forms of persuasion. 
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This framework advances PR and propaganda scholarship by clarifying our understanding of 
manipulative and propagandistic forms of organized persuasive communication and by providing a 
starting point for more fully evaluating the role of deception, incentivization and coercion, within 
contemporary liberal democracies.
Keywords
coercion, deception, manipulation, organized persuasive communication, propaganda, 
promotional culture, public relations, sociology
Introduction
Research in the fields of propaganda and persuasion studies has proliferated since the early 20th 
century when the rise of mass communication and literacy focused attention on how organized 
communication is used in pursuit of influence. Indeed, what we label as organized persuasive com-
munication (OPC), a generic short-hand term used in this article to refer to all organized persuasion 
activities (including advertising and marketing, propaganda, public relations, organizational com-
munication, information/influence campaigns, psychological operations, strategic communication 
and a whole host of other overlapping terms), is central to the exercise of power across all social 
spheres. In the new internet-based media environment, new forms of persuasion and influence are 
manifesting themselves through mechanisms of surveillance, micro-targeting and digital propa-
ganda (González, 2017). However, there exist considerable terminological confusion and signifi-
cant conceptual limitations across these fields. Scholars of PR (and related fields), as well as 
promotional culture, focus on what they perceive to be non-manipulative forms of OPC occurring 
within contemporary liberal democracies, while scholars of propaganda focus on its manipulative 
forms and on either historical cases or non-democratic societies. Across these fields, there is mini-
mal conceptual development with regard to manipulative modes of OPC involving deception, 
incentivization and coercion. As a consequence, manipulative OPC within liberal democracies is a 
blind spot, rarely recognized let alone researched, and with the result that our understanding and 
grasp of these activities is profoundly curtailed.
In order to move research in these fields forward, we resolve these problems through the devel-
opment of a new conceptual framework that draws upon sociology, political science, communica-
tion studies, philosophy, persuasion, rhetoric and behavioural economics, and that theorizes 
precisely manipulative forms of OPC. The framework also demarcates what counts as non-
manipulative, or what we call consensual, forms of persuasion. Our main focus in this article is 
on the manipulative and propagandistic modes of OPC, primarily because it is these that have 
been paid the least attention across the literature (as we will show), but we do also conceptualize 
non-manipulative OPC: we devise a continuum of OPC ranging from the most consensual 
(Habermasian dialogical communication) to the least consensual (outright coercion). In present-
ing non-consensual OPC, we explicate propagandistic forms of persuasion involving deception, 
incentivization and coercion, delineating core features and highlighting its operation through 
researched and documented examples. The framework is a significant conceptual advance. While 
some aspects of the strategy of deception are well documented, other techniques by which it oper-
ates are poorly understood. Meanwhile, strategies of incentivization and coercion are rarely 
addressed, thus neglecting an important dimension of OPC that operates in relation to physical, 
socio-political and economic contexts where incentives and threats are part of persuasive com-
munication activities. Most importantly, the conceptual framework provides a starting point for 
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scholars of PR, propaganda and promotional culture to explore more fully the issue of manipula-
tive and propagandistic OPC in contemporary democracies: in doing so, our understanding of 
how power is exercised in society, across political, economic and military spheres is advanced.
The article proceeds in three sections. Section one provides some illustrations of well-docu-
mented examples of the use of deception, incentivization and coercion as persuasive strategies 
across major political, social and military contexts within liberal democracies. Section two consid-
ers three broad categories of scholarship examining OPC (PR [and related fields], propaganda and 
promotional culture) and shows they do not fully attend to its incentivizing, deceptive and coercive 
dimensions. Section three develops the conceptual framework. Drawing upon the concept of con-
sent (freely chosen and informed agreement), the framework distinguishes OPC that is consensual 
and therefore non-manipulative, from that which is non-consensual (propagandistic) and manipu-
lates via deception, incentivization and/or coercion. The article concludes by summarizing the 
utility of this framework for advancing our theoretical and empirical grasp of OPC and notes the 
importance of further critical evaluation of OPC activities and their impact on democracy.
Deception, Incentivization and Coercion
Deception, incentivization and coercion occur across democratic and non-democratic states. 
Deception is a perennial concern dating back at least to Ancient Greece including in Plato’s The 
Republic and Aristotle’s On Rhetoric (Corner, 2007). Documented and widely accepted examples 
of political deception in democratic states include the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals. In 
Watergate, President Nixon lied about his attempts to subvert the democratic process (Sheehan, 
1971); in Iran-Contra, US officials lied about arms sales to Iran and supporting the Contras, who 
were attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan Sandinista Government. In Watergate, proof of 
Nixon’s guilt emerged with taped meetings detailing the cover-up strategy: Nixon’s claim that he 
was unaware of a cover-up was revealed as a lie. In the case of Iran-Contra, although President 
Reagan’s awareness of what was going on is disputed, senior officials clearly lied (Wroe, 1992). 
More recently, regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Mearsheimer (2011) argues that the US 
Administration lied in its claims that it knew for certain Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD). Moreover, the contemporary internet environment is particularly vulnerable to deception 
strategies. For example during the 2016 US presidential election campaign battle between Donald 
Trump and Hillary Clinton, fake news stories, ranging from outright lies to those embracing more 
subtle deceptive forms (omission, distortion and misdirection) spread across the internet. Bakir and 
McStay (2018) explore how such deception is spread online via the economics of emotion: fake 
news providers create deceptive and outrageous stories and headlines (clickbait) to generate user 
attention and viewing time, which converts to digital advertising revenue for fake news providers. 
Also, the rise of the political bot (Woolley and Howard, 2017) highlights the sophistication of 
deception tools available in the online environment. During the 2010 US midterm elections and 
Massachusetts special election, social bots were reportedly used to support some candidates and 
smear their opponents, by creating thousands of tweets pointing to websites with fake news 
(Metaxas and Mustafaraj, 2012; Ratkiewicz et al., 2011).
Beyond deception, incentivization (offering or providing benefits) and coercion (threatening or 
actually inflicting costs) are also features of both democratic and non-democratic states. Incentives 
and coercion, we argue, are important elements of many OPC strategies, yet are rarely mentioned 
in the literature. Indeed, regarding coercion, a small literature on rhetoric and persuasion from the 
1960s and 1970s (Andrews, 1969; Simon, 1972) highlights the inadequacy of a simplistic persua-
sion-coercion dichotomy. Interestingly, this literature focuses only on coercion emerging from 
non-elite challenges from the political left rather than the far more frequent and vastly better 
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resourced manipulative OPC employed by powerful state and corporate interests. Writing in the 
context of the civil disruption experienced throughout 1960s America, Professor of Speech Herbert 
Simon (1972: 231) argued that scholars, when examining social conflict, had ‘failed to distinguish 
between cases of “pure” persuasion and cases involving combinations of persuasive and coercive 
elements’. They were clinging, he wrote, ‘to an antiquated “persuasion-coercion” dichotomy’. He 
argued that the study of rhetoric and social control needed to move beyond focusing on ‘speakers 
and speeches’ to explore physical threats (e.g. during militant protests) and also ‘institutions and 
structures’ as influencing conduct via ‘coercive persuasion’ (Simon, 1972: 242). Similarly, James 
R. Andrews suggested that persuasion and coercion were part of the overall rhetorical process. To 
demonstrate, he explored examples of how riots were integral to the persuasion process that led to 
a 19th century Reform Bill (Andrews, 1970: 187) and also the persuasion-coercion interface dur-
ing 1968 Vietnam War student protests (Andrews, 1969; see also Artz and Pollack, 1997; Manheim, 
2011: 103, 323). We draw upon these ideas when defining coercive OPC later in the article, while 
also noting the importance of expanding attention to include the routine use of coercive persuasion 
by powerful political and economic actors.
Examples of both incentivization and coercion can be readily identified across democratic states. 
Regarding incentivization, for example, during elections promised tax cuts are frequently used as a 
method of securing votes by persuading people who otherwise would not be inclined to vote for that 
candidate. Incentivization can also work more indirectly. For instance, cultural and educational 
exchange programmes associated with public diplomacy involve provision of benefits that encour-
age recipients to be favourably disposed toward the country/state providing them. Also, incentiviza-
tion can have a coercive dimension. An example of this was the US message to Nicaraguans during 
their 1990 elections which, according to Chomsky (1990) was to vote for the US-backed candidate 
or face continuing US economic warfare; here the potential lifting of the sanctions was incentiviza-
tion and the threat of their continuation was coercive. Regarding coercion, these strategies are inte-
gral to military ‘information operations’ where, for instance, ‘hearts and minds’ operations frequently 
involve the integration of OPC with military force: here officials recognize ‘that the success of 
non-kinetic effect is amplified by threats of kinetic activity’ (where ‘kinetic’ means military force) 
(Miller, 2015). A clear example of coercive OPC can be seen with the use of radio broadcasts and 
air-dropped leaflets aimed at encouraging enemy combatants to surrender during the 1991 Gulf War 
and the 2001 war in Afghanistan (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012: 12; Taylor, 2002: 21‒22). Here, the 
persuasive effect of these propaganda leaflets revolved around the implicit threat: surrender or die. 
Coercive OPC is not the sole preserve of military operations, however, and, as we shall see later in 
the article, it also occurs in many political-economic realms.
In sum, strategies of deception, incentivization and coercion are recognizable persuasion strate-
gies, and they occur across political, social and economic events within democracies. However, 
existing literatures only minimally engage with these forms of persuasion, as we will now show.
PR, Propaganda Studies and Promotional Culture: Failing to Get 
to Grips with Deception, Incentivization and Coercion
We divide existing scholarship on OPC into three groups: PR (and related subfields), propaganda 
studies and work under the heading of ‘promotional culture’. Under the label of PR (and related 
subfields) we include the range of persuasive communication activities captured in labels such as 
advertising and marketing, public relations, organizational communication, influence/information 
operations, psychological operations and strategic communication. Although some object to using 
PR as a group label, most scholarship in these areas owes a considerable debt to PR as a developing 
set of doctrines (Carey, 1997), and PR represents the most established academic field other than 
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that of propaganda. Propaganda studies can be traced to early 20th century analysts such as the 
political scientist and sociologist Harold Lasswell (1935), the sociologists Paul Lazarsfeld and 
Robert Merton (1943), and the journalist and commentator Walter Lippman (1922) who sometimes 
saw organized manipulation of the masses as an unfortunate necessity in a democracy (Simpson 
1994). Today, the term propaganda is usually associated with nefarious communication and most 
current definitions include the notion of manipulation (Corner, 2007; Lasswell et al., 1935; 
Lippman, 1922: 43‒44; Marlin, 2013: 7‒10): As Marlin (2013: 12) puts it: ‘At some point in a 
chain of reasoning a hidden, misleading, or otherwise unexamined presupposition will affect the 
outcome in a way not assessed by the propagandee.’ Finally, work on promotional culture repre-
sents a third, and most recently developed, strand of relevant literature. Building upon an under-
standing of promotion and persuasion in the commercial realm, promotional culture has sought to 
understand all OPC activities through the lens of commercial advertising and promotional 
activities.
We now discuss these three groupings of scholarship in detail: we show that they do not pay 
sufficient attention to conceptualizing manipulative persuasion involving deception, incentiviza-
tion and coercion.
Public Relations and Related Fields: You do Propaganda, We do PR
Scholars of PR and related subfields eschew the term propaganda; most argue that the OPC activi-
ties they study, mainly in western liberal democracies, are largely non-manipulative and non-
propagandistic. For these scholars, highly manipulative OPC (i.e. propaganda), occurs rarely in 
contemporary liberal democracies and belongs either to authoritarian states, the early 20th cen-
tury or the ‘enemy’. Few engage with manipulation via deception, incentivization or coercion. 
One exception here is Manheim’s (2011) account of Information and Influence Campaigns (IICs), 
which he labels as part of manipulative strategic political communication. However, while recog-
nizing incentivization as part of mobilizing coalitions, he only briefly refers to coercion (in the 
form of violent acts and protest) in the appendix (2011: 323) and an example box (2011: 103) and 
does not discuss deception. Moreover, similar to the small literature on rhetoric and persuasion 
from the 1960s and 1970s (Andrew, 1969; Simon, 1972), Manheim (2011: 126) discusses incen-
tivizing activities as strategies pursued by ‘the weaker party in an asymmetric power relation-
ship’, thereby sidestepping examination of their routine use by powerful actors.
Two reasons why PR scholarship tends to ignore deception, incentivization and coercion con-
cern (a) deliberate attempts to distance PR from propaganda and (b) a tendency among some to 
conflate all persuasion with manipulation. We discuss each in turn.
First, there has been a drive to distance contemporary persuasion activities from manipulative 
propaganda. In the early 20th century the term propaganda carried few negative connotations 
(Simpson, 1994). However, its extensive use during the First World War led to its rebranding. 
Edward Bernays, recollected that: ‘propaganda got to be a bad word because of the Germans … 
using it [during WW1]. So what I did was to … find some other words. So we found the words 
Counsel on Public Relations’ (Bernays cited in Miller and Dinan, 2008: 5). This led to the renam-
ing of various forms of OPC (with some exceptions, such as enemy war-time propaganda) as PR, 
thereby disguising OPC involving manipulation. A contemporary expression of this approach in 
PR scholarship is Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) influential four models of PR. As Moloney (2006: xiii) 
notes, they set out four categories of PR, three of which involve propagandistic or manipulative 
communication. The fourth category ‒ non-propagandistic symmetrical two-way communication 
‒ ‘has taken hold’ as a concept ‘in many universities … to over-emphasise PR as a practice of virtu-
ous messaging, known as two-way communications between equal, listening, negotiating, 
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mutually respectful message senders and receivers’. Moloney (2006: xiiii) scathingly writes that it 
takes ‘the PR academy into a neverland of perfection’.
Second, the effort to distance PR (and related fields) from propaganda by some scholars has 
occurred alongside the argument by others that all persuasion equates to manipulation: this has 
served as a reason to avoid theorizing manipulative strategies such as deception and coercion. Part 
of the backdrop to this position lies in postmodern argument positing that all communication is a 
‘language game’ (Lyotard, 1979: 9) involving power and attempts at legitimation. Truth claims 
must, it is argued, appeal to meta-narratives where the postmodern condition is ‘incredulity toward 
meta-narratives’ (Lyotard, 1979: xxiv). From this standpoint it is near impossible to distinguish 
between non-manipulative and manipulative communication because one cannot delineate between 
true (non-deceptive) and untrue (deceptive) statements while all communication is reduced to a 
play of power within a ‘language game’. This problem has been compounded by some scholars, 
such as Taylor, defining propaganda as ‘a practical process of persuasion’ involving ‘attempts to 
influence our opinions’ (1992 cited in Corner, 2007: 671), thus treating propaganda, persuasion 
and manipulation as synonymous. Counter to this position, we argue that persuasion and manipula-
tion are not synonymous. Manipulation works against autonomy by enabling some people to obtain 
power over others. This can be distinct from persuading someone through non-manipulative (or 
consensual) argumentation. Also, we do not follow Van Dijk’s (2006) separation of persuasion and 
manipulation as distinct activities but rather understand manipulation as a subset of persuasion in 
line with Jowett and O’Donnell (2012). In short, for our purposes, not all persuasion involves 
manipulation although it sometimes does and, by distinguishing consensual from non-consensual 
persuasion, our conceptual framework will further clarify this distinction, as we shall see later.
Both of these arguments (PR and propaganda are distinct, persuasion and manipulation are 
synonymous) divert scholarship away from studying manipulative forms of OPC. For instance, in 
a recent special issue on PR and democracy (Taylor, 2013), only three articles out of 23 offer criti-
cisms of ‘PR’, while the rest either explain its role in a democracy or advocate its benefits without 
ever discussing deception, incentivization or coercion. Regarding the military sphere, where one 
might expect to find greater discussion of deception and coercion, a similar pattern emerges. For 
example, Cioppa (2009) evaluated strategic communication operations in Iraq, while Ringsmose 
and Borgesen (2011) assessed the effectiveness of NATO’s ‘strategic narratives’ at maintaining 
support for war in Afghanistan. In both articles, Coalition communication strategies are assumed 
to be non-manipulative. Across much of this literature, manipulation/propaganda is raised only in 
relation to the enemy, as in Smith and Walsh’s (2013) assessment of whether drone strikes degrade 
Al Qaeda’s ‘propaganda’ output. Another example is Dearth’s (2002: 10) assertion that democra-
cies ‘rarely’ engage in deception and that, ‘overwhelmingly’, democracies employ non-deceptive 
strategies. Regarding coercion, Dearth states: ‘Perception Management mechanisms will most 
often be employed in conjunction with the physical elements (active or deterrent) … to form a 
synergistic whole’ (2002: 2), but says nothing more about this evidently coercive dimension. 
Incentivization is also not discussed. Similar patterns are discernible across the political science 
literature on political marketing/communication (e.g. Kavanagh, 1995). Here spin is thought by 
many, though certainly not all, to be largely unproblematic for democracy, and questions of decep-
tion, incentivization and coercion receive little attention.
Propaganda Studies: Propaganda is All Around
Where PR scholars see ‘two-way consensual communication’, propaganda scholars see manipula-
tive OPC. Indeed, propaganda scholars (e.g. Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012; Moloney, 2006) fre-
quently argue that many of the activities described by scholars of PR (and related fields) involve 
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manipulation consistent with the propaganda described by early theorists (such as Lasswell and 
Lippman). Some criticize what they see as the obfuscating and euphemism-laden nature of PR (and 
related fields), arguing that such language deflects ‘attention away from the realities of what they 
[democracies] do’ when ‘conducting propaganda’ (Taylor, 2002: 20). As a field, propaganda stud-
ies (e.g. Briant, 2015; Carey, 1997; Ellul, 1965; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012; Miller and Dinan, 
2008) focuses largely on historical examples including the 1914‒1918 and 1939‒1945 wars and 
Cold War, or otherwise attends to propaganda in non-democratic states. Only a handful of scholars 
focus on negative consequences of propaganda in contemporary liberal democracies. For example, 
Carey (1997) explores corporate OPC subversion of democracy while Morrison (2015) highlights 
deception during the 2003 Iraq invasion. This scholarship offers some, albeit limited, treatment of 
deception, incentivization and coercion.
Deception: Black and White Propaganda. Regarding deception, propaganda scholars often invoke the 
black-white dichotomy. This dichotomy has evolved from an initial distinction used to describe 
black propaganda, where the ‘source is concealed’ (Doob, 1950: 433), and white propaganda, 
where the source is undisguised. For the propagandist, greater persuasiveness can sometimes be 
attained by disguising the source (e.g. when knowledge of the message’s true source may damage 
message credibility). In some treatments, however, the issue of honesty over source is associated 
with honesty of message content: Jowett and O’Donnell (2012) combine source and message in 
their definition of black and white propaganda plus add the category of grey propaganda; for them, 
white propaganda involves dissemination of truthful information from an undisguised source. It is:
what one hears on Radio Moscow and VOA during peacetime. Although what listeners hear is … close to 
the truth, it … attempts to convince the audience that the sender is the ‘good guy’ with the best ideas … 
National celebrations, with their overt patriotism … can usually be classified as white propaganda. (Jowett 
and O’Donnell, 2012: 17)
In contrast, ‘black propaganda’ is when the source is concealed or credited to a false authority and 
spreads lies, fabrications and deceptions. Black propaganda is the ‘big lie’ (Jowett and O’Donnell, 
2012: 17). Grey propaganda is anything in between.
While the engagement with deception is welcome, the black-grey-white conceptualization does 
require development. The original version, relating to whether the source is disguised, only par-
tially addresses the question of deceptive messaging a truthful message might be from a disguised 
source while an untruthful message may come from an undisguised source. Moreover, the distinc-
tion between truthful white propaganda and untruthful black propaganda is unproductive because 
it implies that absence of falsehoods and an undisguised source equals truthfulness. However, 
deception can be achieved through half-truths or omissions. For instance, during war, OPC fre-
quently involves highlighting real military successes but downplaying failures thereby deceiving 
people about actual military progress (Arendt, 1972). Regarding the examples of white propaganda 
provided by Jowett and O’Donnell, it is not clear why these are truthful; the white propaganda 
witnessed during national celebrations is replete with distorted, emotive, national myths often 
amounting to or involving deception (Mearsheimer, 2011: 80). In short, deception is achievable 
without resort to lying, which Jowett and O’Donnell associate with black propaganda. We develop 
this point more fully later in our typology of deception.
Incentivization and Coercion in Propaganda Studies. Across the field of propaganda studies there is 
only very limited engagement with incentivization and coercion (e.g. Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012: 
12; Taylor, 2002: 21‒22) and, at best, only a handful of propaganda studies explicitly explore 
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incentivizing and coercive OPC in contemporary liberal democracies (Miller and Dinan, 2008; 
Rushkoff, 1999; Simpson, 1994). For example, Simpson documents coercive Cold War US psy-
chological warfare. He argues that propaganda is central to psychological warfare, which ‘is the 
application of mass communication to modern social conflict: it focuses on the combined use of 
violence and more conventional forms of communication’ (Simpson, 1994: 11). In recognizing 
coercive OPC, these accounts reflect early 20th century propaganda writers such as Laswell who 
wrote: ‘successful social and political management often depends on proper coordination of propa-
ganda with coercion, violent or non-violent; economic inducement (including bribery)’ (cited in 
Simpson, 1994: 18).
Promotional Culture: An Advertising, Marketing and Branding Saturated World?
A more recent approach to OPC which pays rather more attention to marketing, advertising and 
branding than the previous two areas of work is that associated with the term ‘promotional culture’, 
coined by Andrew Wernick (1988). Though he subsequently wrote about other issues such as 
‘branding’ and ‘marketing’ (Wernick, 2006), Wernick was chiefly concerned with advertising, hav-
ing written on the topic for some years prior to his 1991 book Promotional Culture. There is much 
to be said for this approach to the seemingly all encompassing nature of promotional culture. It has 
been useful to the extent that it accepts that strategy and interests are involved and to the extent that 
it sees advertising, PR and propaganda as parts of a continuum.
Wernick (1988: 182) draws attention to the fact that the term ‘promotion’ is more expansive 
than alternatives such as advertising or publicity in particular. Modern usage has ‘stretched’ pro-
motion to ‘cover not just ads as such but the whole field of public relations, including religious and 
political propaganda’. In an analysis ‘concerned with stressing the growth of salesmanship not just 
within but beyond the strictly commercial sphere, this greater generality’ is an important reason to 
use the term, he suggests. Aeron Davis (2013) has further developed the notion of promotion in his 
book Promotional Cultures. He applies promotion in a sociologically informed way ranging over 
commodities, celebrity, politics, civil society and the economy in a productive fashion. The analy-
sis is cogent, and shows, we suggest, the deep penetration of marketing and promotional rationali-
ties even in areas traditionally outside the reach of the market.
While a useful approach, promotional culture does leave out key aspects of what we see as the 
wider term of OPC. Because of its focus on market processes, commercialization and ‘salesman-
ship’, promotional culture underplays the importance of the state and its role in the opposite of 
‘promotion’, perhaps we can call it ‘minimization’. As a result, manipulative and deceptive prac-
tices, such as secrecy, misdirection and silence (which are frequently adopted by states and indeed 
by corporations) are paid little attention. The literature on promotional culture also pays scant 
attention to coercive OPC. In addition, the idea of promotional culture can make the mistake of 
thinking that the problem of manipulative OPC is largely one of the ‘salesmanship’, when both 
corporate and especially state OPC strategies are only partially captured by that dynamic.
Moving the Field Forward
Deception, incentivization and coercion are facts of the political, social and economic world, even 
in democracies. They are recognizable in war, class conflict, political campaigning and many 
issues such as manipulative OPC by the tobacco industry regarding smoking risks, causing 100 
million deaths in the 20th century (Michaels, 2008), or attempts by the fossil fuel industry to obfus-
cate climate change understanding (Oreskes and Conway, 2011). However, across the literature, 
these manipulative forms of OPC are inadequately researched and conceptualized. In part this is 
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because the majority of scholarship on PR (and related fields) focuses on activities involving 
largely consensual persuasion and not persuasion through deception, incentivization and coercion. 
The limited work there is (e.g. Manheim, 2011) focuses on the use of manipulative strategies by 
only subaltern groups in society. For these scholars, OPC approximating to propaganda is associ-
ated only with authoritarian states, enemies, history or left-wing activists. The literature on propa-
ganda, while arguing that manipulative OPC is integral to the contemporary world, including 
liberal democracies, makes marginal progress on conceptualizing deception via the problematic 
black-grey-white typology while OPC involving incentivization or coercion is considered briefly 
at best. The field of promotional culture shares a similar neglect of manipulative forms of persua-
sive communication.
Of course, these lacunae are, potentially, of great significance. If we neither conceptualize nor 
pay attention to manipulative and propagandistic forms of OPC, scholars may well be significantly 
under-measuring and under-estimating their occurrence within democratic states. This is impor-
tant, both for the adequacy of scholarship and any assessment of the democratic health of contem-
porary democracies. Furthermore, remaining unaware of how manipulation and propaganda 
function, through strategies of deception, incentivization and coercion, inhibits our ability to criti-
cally examine persuasive strategies and to develop better, less manipulative, modes of persuasion 
more suitable to democratic politics.
To move forward, an essential first step is to fully define and conceptualize deceptive OPC and 
incentivizing and coercive OPC in which persuasion operates through physical, socio-political 
and economic contexts as well as via communication and discourse. This task also involves defin-
ing and conceptualizing fully non-manipulative persuasion. Drawing upon sociology, international 
relations, political science, communications, philosophy, persuasion and rhetoric, it is to this task 
we now turn.
The Conceptual Framework
Our new conceptual framework (see Figure 1) is presented according to consensual (italics) and 
non-consensual (bold) sub-categories. The third tier of boxes at the bottom of Figure 1 thus pre-
sents a continuum of persuasion from left to right, ranging from consensual to coercive. We now 
detail the framework, starting with consensual forms of communication (dialogical consensual 
communication); and progressing to non-consensual (propagandistic) forms of OPC. As already 
Figure 1. Organized persuasive communication.
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noted, the main focus of this article is on the manipulative and propagandistic modes of OPC, 
primarily because these have been paid the least attention across the literature (as discussed previ-
ously). However, we start by briefly setting out non-manipulative OPC.
Consensual Organized Persuasive Communication
Our conceptualization of consensual OPC rests upon the idea of consent. We define consent as 
informed and freely given agreement with something, be it a view or an action by that person or 
someone else. We follow Wertheimer’s (1987: 4) ‘voluntariness principle’, which states that moral 
and legal positions in relation to the legitimacy of actions rest upon whether an individual is acting 
freely or is, alternatively, coerced. When someone is persuaded under false pretences, incentivized 
via promise or providing of benefits, or coerced through threats or actual infliction of costs (includ-
ing withdrawal of benefits), consent is not freely given. For scholars of argumentation, incentiviza-
tion and coercion are problematic because desire to obtain reward or avoid punishment or ‘fear of 
force [causes] acceptance of a conclusion’ (Carney and Sheer, 1980: 390). Equally, consent is 
violated when someone is persuaded through deception as consent is not ‘fully informed’. Although 
the terms ‘coerced consent’ (Kaplan and Dixon, 1996/97) and ‘manufacture of consent’ (Herman 
and Chomsky, 1988; Lippman, 1922) are common, we prefer the term non-consensual persuasive 
communication to emphasize that in neither case is the person truly consenting. Consensual OPC 
must meet two requirements: first, absence of deception; and second, absence of incentivization 
and coercion, therefore, consent is given freely.
Building upon the work of Habermas, we can identify two forms of consensual OPC: dialogical 
consensual communication and strategic (one-way) consensual persuasion. We discuss each in turn.
Dialogical Consensual Communication. Habermas’ ‘communicative action’ involves two-way dia-
logical communication aimed at consensus/mutual understanding whereby actors ‘seek to reach an 
understanding … in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement’ (Habermas, 1984). As 
Bohman and Rehg (2014) summarize, Habermas identifies four essential ideal speech conditions 
for ‘communicative action’ to occur: (i) no one capable of making a relevant contribution is 
excluded, (ii) participants have equal voice, (iii) they are free to speak their honest opinion without 
deception or self-deception, and (iv) there are no sources of coercion. As such, ‘communicative 
action’ does not involve one-way persuading others of one’s own views, which Habermas labels 
‘teleological action’, but rather two-way consensus building toward cooperative goals. Also, 
although Habermas originally conceived of ‘communicative action’ as distinct from persuasion, 
subsequent discussion, with which we concur, suggests that persuasion is a part of ‘communicative 
action’ (Bohmann and Rehg, 2017).
By definition, then, ‘communicative action’ is genuinely two-way and does not involve decep-
tion, incentivization or coercion. In Figure 1, this is represented by our category dialogical consen-
sual communication. Examples of dialogical OPC might include citizen juries that enable citizens 
to reach informed consensus on issues with the intent to influence policymaking (Coote and 
Lenaghan, 1997).
Strategic (One-Way) Consensual Persuasion. For Habermas, ‘teleological action’, involving strategic 
attempts to persuade, is not consensual because it violates the ‘ideal speech’ conditions, principally 
because it involves strategic (one-way) persuasion thus violating the condition that ‘participants 
have equal voice’. However, we argue that this places too high a benchmark (i.e. dialogical con-
sensual communication) for consensual persuasion. Specifically, it is difficult to conceive how 
ideal speech conditions necessary for dialogical consensual communication can easily and 
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routinely be realized in contemporary mass democracies: one-way teleological or strategic attempts 
to persuade are seemingly unavoidable. However, contrary to Habermas, we argue that persuasion 
through ‘teleological action’ can be consensual providing it is free from deception, incentivization 
and coercion. In Figure 1, this is represented by the category strategic (one-way) consensual per-
suasion. It is not as consensual as dialogical consensual communication, but it has enough consen-
sual elements to classify it as consensual (i.e. it is free and informed).
For example, anti-smoking campaigns are in some respects strategic consensual persuasion. 
They are not deceptive (smoking is harmful), and frequently involve both reasoned and emotional 
arguments regarding smoking risks. Importantly, just because an anti-smoking campaign invokes 
fear, this does not necessarily make it coercive: coercion involves forcing someone through issuing 
credible threats such as ‘Unless you do what I want you to, I will harm you.’ This is different from 
providing information on harms to health. At the same time, mildly coercive strategies are also 
employed as a part of drives to cut harms from smoking (e.g. smoking bans). But, at least in prin-
ciple, these campaigns can operate within the realm of strategic consensual persuasion. OPC aimed 
at mobilizing a population for war can also be consensual: if a country faces real threat, then a 
campaign for military action to defend it could in principle be non-deceptive and non-coercive. In 
an election campaign, if democracy is to be realized, OPC should be non-deceptive, non-coercive 
and avoid incentivization.
We should state our view on whether consensual OPC is ever fully achievable and on the ‘emo-
tive’ and ‘irrational’ dimensions of persuasion. To be achievable, in terms of providing sufficient 
information, any successful OPC campaign needs to be concise. It is not possible to include all 
information. Yet, we posit that, for the information to be consensual it must contain the relevant 
information that can allow a rational and informed decision to be made. This means that critical 
information should not be omitted or distorted in a way that leads an individual to be persuaded 
when otherwise, with the included or undistorted information, they would not be (we discuss key 
forms of deception including distortion and omission shortly). So, for example, an OPC campaign 
seeking to challenge human causes of climate change, perhaps funded by the fossil fuel industry, 
would be deceptive if it over-represented the views of the small minority of scientists who question 
the overwhelming scientific evidence that fossil fuel combustion is the key source of climate 
change and ignored scientists who accept the state of the evidence. This OPC campaign would be 
non-consensual because it would be deceptive about the scientific evidence and thus those who 
accepted it would have come to believe something under false pretences.
With respect to emotive and irrational persuasive appeals, many elements of OPC, especially in 
advertising/marketing, involve provoking involuntary, affective and visceral feelings (McStay, 
2013). While these may breach strict Habermasian-style rationality requirements, there is no intrin-
sic reason why they should be understood as necessarily deceptive, coercive or, with respect to 
emotions, irrational. As others have argued, back to Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric, emotions are intrin-
sic to the process of reasoning (Sokolon, 2006). For example, depictions of distraught children 
mourning the absence of a father who died from smoking makes an emotive, but accurate, point 
that smoking increases risks of premature death, which impacts upon loved ones. Whatever else 
might be said about this persuasive technique, it is not deceptive. By contrast, using images of 
young, healthy, active people in tobacco adverts is deceptive. As such, according to our framework, 
irrational/emotional appeals need to be understood in the context of whether or not they contribute 
to the deceptive or coercive nature of the OPC event in question.
Non-Consensual Organized Persuasive Communication (Propaganda)
We divide non-consensual OPC (propaganda) into the categories of deception, incentivization, 
coercion and deceptive coercion.
12 Critical Sociology 00(0)
Deception. Drawing on research on lying in politics (Cliffe et al., 2000; Corner, 2007; Mearsheimer, 
2011) and philosophical scholarship on deception and lying (Carson, 2012), we define deceptive 
information management as persuasion via lying, distortion, omission or misdirection. There may 
be other types of deception, but these are the types found frequently in our review of the field. 
Deceptive information management is non-consensual because it violates the requirement of 
informed consent; the target of persuasion is unable to reach an informed decision because of inad-
equate information.
Deception through lying is defined as making a statement that is known or suspected to be 
untrue in order to mislead. The Watergate and Iran-Contra cases noted earlier are confirmed cases 
of this form of deception. To support lies, disinformation may also be used, whereby forgeries and 
staged events are used (Martin, 1982): in the internet environment, the phenomenon known as the 
‘sock puppet’ involves the use of fake online identities and has been used, for example, by the mak-
ers of the beer brand Stella Artois (Watson, 2012) and the US military’s Special Operations 
Command (Fielding and Cobain, 2011). However, communicators know that, when exposed, lies 
can damage credibility and so tend to be motivated to mislead in other ways. Accordingly, lying 
has traditionally been seen as a last resort: ‘Every propagandist worth his mettle will use the truth 
in preference to lies whenever he can; even Dr. Goebbels … “Lies have short legs,”’ (Friedrich, 
1943). Approaches to deception which are often seen as more subtle, and therefore more effective 
than lying, involve omission, distortion and misdirection.
Deception through omission involves withholding information to make the promoted viewpoint 
more persuasive. It is deceptive because those involved know people would be less likely to be 
persuaded if they knew the full picture. As noted before, apparently truthful white propaganda can 
be deceptive due to omission. Deception through omission can also occur through disguising the 
source’s identity. Miller (1994) researched and documented the case of the London Radio Service 
(LRS) set up by the British Foreign Office to provide media outlets with information conducive to 
British Government objectives. The deception involved here was that many media outlets picking 
up the LRS reports were either unaware the information was government sourced, or failed to 
clearly identify the stories as such. This deception through omission (that LRS was a government 
source) was intentional on the part of the British Government. Deception over sources has become 
easier in the internet environment: for example, the use of techniques such as the ‘front group’, 
where vested interests are disguised by ostensibly independent groups, has become common in the 
internet age and a term has been coined to describe fake online identities – the ‘sock puppet’ 
(Solorio et al., 2013).
Deception through distortion involves presenting a statement in a deliberately misleading way 
to support a viewpoint. One form of distortion is exaggeration but it can also involve de-emphasiz-
ing information, for instance by releasing controversial information on busy news days. Herring 
and Robinson (2014, 2014‒15) documented how the UK Government engaged in these types of 
deception before the 2003 Iraq War: using techniques of distortions of available intelligence and 
omissions, the British Government drafted a dossier presenting a picture of high confidence that 
Iraq posed a large WMD threat, while the intelligence only indicated weak evidence of a much 
smaller WMD threat. The pattern of exaggerations and distortions was also reflected among US 
officials in sound bites such as ‘we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud’ (National 
Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice – see CNN 2002), evoking the nightmare of a terrorist nuclear 
attack. These messages were deceptive as they involved distortion and exaggeration of intelligence 
assessments, but avoided outright lying.
Deception through misdirection entails producing and disseminating true information intended 
to direct attention away from problematic issues (political campaign advisors have coined the term 
‘pivot’ to describes this and journalists have taken it up in their reporting of campaigns). For 
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example, Bakir (2013) analysed British and US management of the public revelation of the Bush 
Administration’s secret torture-intelligence policy and British complicity. This entailed instigating 
numerous investigations and inquiries across the USA and UK. These were utilized to misdirect 
attention to a narrow part of policy failure (e.g. inadequate military training on how to handle 
detainees) and away from deeper issues. The deeper issues included the existence of a secret tor-
ture-intelligence policy, torture through ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’, the fact that the CIA 
was central to this policy, and the complicity of other nations.
Finally, although lying is commonly perceived as the most serious mode of deception, omis-
sions, distortions and misdirections can be as serious as lying. For example, as highlighted in the 
literature on propaganda and war, populations can be galvanized by campaigns emphasizing enemy 
atrocities. Although such stories can be true, they may also involve the omission of atrocities com-
mitted by one’s own side or distorting victim counts. Outright lying, then, is not required to mobi-
lize support for (or undermine opposition to) a war. Furthermore, deceiving without lying facilitates 
avoiding accountability should deception be discovered. For instance, deceivers can claim forget-
fulness (for omissions); they may claim distortion imposed by media formats (such as tabloid news 
or online fake news formats); and they may claim that ‘necessary’ information is already publicly 
available.
Incentivization. We define incentivization as a process of persuasion that involves promising or 
providing benefits. Broadly, this involves creating a benefit (an extrinsic motivation) aimed at 
overcoming an individual’s actual desire/belief (their intrinsic motivation). Of course, not all acts 
of incentivization are non-consensual. The provision of a bike-and-ride scheme, whereby people 
are incentivized to ride bikes, is broadly consensual as here the incentive (the extrinsic motivation) 
is both positive and if taken up, aligned with the individual’s intrinsic motivation (i.e. the individ-
ual actually wants to ride the bike). Incentivization can, however, be far less consensual.
For example, incentivization becomes manipulative when the extrinsic motivation conflicts 
with an individual’s intrinsic motivation. In the example mentioned earlier regarding elections 
and tax cuts, promising tax cuts (an extrinsic motivation) is a way of garnering votes by persuad-
ing people who otherwise would not be inclined (i.e. had no intrinsic motivation) to vote for that 
candidate; this is not consensual because the individual is induced to do something he or she 
would otherwise not want to do. Also, regarding the earlier example regarding public diplomacy 
and exchange programmes, these cultural and educational programmes involve provision of ben-
efits that encourage recipients to be favourably disposed toward the country/state providing them. 
Here the process is not consensual because positive feelings toward the provider are based not on 
an intrinsic belief, but are the result (perhaps in part) of the benefits (extrinsic motivations) 
received. A documented example of incentivizing OPC is that of the provision of housing and 
childcare in Vanport, Oregon, during the 1940s. This was part of a propaganda campaign aimed 
at persuading women to adopt new work roles and increase their productivity (Jowett and 
O’Donnell, 2012: 309‒318). Of course, the provision of housing and healthcare is not in itself 
non-consensual because there is an intrinsic desirability for such things; the non-consensual 
aspect is that the outcomes of new work roles and greater productivity were extrinsic to the moti-
vations of those being incentivized. Also, the offering of childcare/housing in exchange for work 
might be seen as relatively consensual under certain conditions, such as adequate existing mate-
rial conditions in which there is a trade-off between new housing and increased productivity. In 
the case of Vanport, however, the persuasive force is more, rather than less, non-consensual 
because the material circumstances of the women was relatively poor: that is to say, they were 
potentially persuaded (incentivized) via promises of childcare and housing largely because of 
their relative deprivation rather than via a more consensual trade-off.
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Coercion. OPC becomes most forceful when it develops coercive dimensions that work through 
exploiting the actual or threatened inflict of costs, including such things as economic sanctions, use 
of physical force and withdrawal of benefits. As discussed earlier, among scholars of persuasion 
and rhetoric a small number have explored the relationship between coercion and persuasion 
(Andrews, 1969; Simon, 1972). These accounts, analysing protest movements from the 1960s and 
1970s, emphasize how ‘coercive persuasion’ can work via social and economic contexts where 
individuals are subjected to duress in situations of structural and relational disadvantage, such as 
physical vulnerability, that influences them to act or think in particular ways. Here persuasive force 
is attained via communicative contexts in which threats and intimidation are in play. In view of 
these studies, we argue it is crucial to understand that communicated threats acquire force from 
physical, social and economic contexts. Following this work, we define coercion as an act of per-
suasion that compels an individual to act against their will through the threat or infliction of costs 
including, but not limited to, physical force.
Coercive OPC operates in a number of ways. Commonly it can involve integration of physical 
actions and threats into the overall persuasion strategy. As noted earlier, one example from the 
military sphere concerns ‘psychological operations’ designed to persuade an enemy to surrender. 
Working through similar mechanisms is the ‘propaganda of the deed’ (Jowett and O’Donnell, 
2012: 301) whereby a violent act is performed at least partly for propagandistic purposes, as with 
9/11 (Louw, 2003) or US ‘Shock and Awe’ strategy during the 2003 Iraq invasion. But coercive 
OPC is not the sole preserve of the military sphere; it also occurs in the commercial realm. The 
‘Mohawk Valley Formula’ for union busting used by the Remington Rand Company during the 
1930s utilized propaganda narratives entwined with coercion:
The formula included discrediting union leaders by calling them ‘agitators’, threatening to move the plant, 
raising the banner of ‘law and order’ to mobilize the community against the union, and engaging police in 
strike-breaking activity, then organizing a back-to-work movement of … employees. (US Department of 
Labor cited in Miller and Dinan, 2008: 52)
These techniques were used to great effect 50 years later to break British trade union power during 
the 1984/85 miners’ strike. Here, coercion was part of an overall strategy that included many ele-
ments as OPC strategists recognized that winning opinion and arguments was not necessarily cen-
tral. Describing the media strategy of the Government and National Coal Board (for which he was 
an adviser), Tim (now Lord) Bell said:
The strategy wasn’t about winning public opinion. It wasn’t about persuading the media. It was about 
getting the miners … back to work. To give in on their strike and to drift back to work with their tails 
between their legs, heads hung low, having failed. (Interview on Channel 4 TV, 2004)
Deceptive Coercion. Finally, coercion also works through other means. For example, coercion can 
interweave with deception (deceptive coercion in Figure 1) via manipulation of fear. Here, people 
are deceived about their understanding of the overall danger. For example, if a government warns 
of a non-existent threat, people may be scared into supporting its abuses of civil liberties: people 
are literally deceived into thinking that their lives are in danger and that supporting their govern-
ment is essential. We define deceptive coercion as persuasion through deceptive manipulation of 
fear of costs. Returning to the 2003 Iraq War example, while messages promoted by the UK gov-
ernment were deceptive, in that they involved distortion and exaggeration of intelligence, they also 
had a coercive dimension working through promoting public fears (with little factual basis) regard-
ing chemical, biological or nuclear attacks.
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Overall, these examples show that, whether utilizing incentivization or coercion, OPC can 
involve strategies aimed at organizing conduct in a way not generally conceived of in the existing 
literature, which has a weak understanding of persuasion that works via socio-political, economic 
and physical mechanisms.
Conclusion
To date, study of what we call OPC has been divided largely between scholars of PR (and related 
fields) who mostly perceive their object of study as largely non-manipulative, scholars of propa-
ganda who concern themselves only with manipulative persuasion, and scholars of promotional 
culture who examine OPC through the lens of commercial advertising and ‘salemanship’. Across 
these bodies of scholarship, the grasp of OPC involving deception, incentivization and coercion has 
been limited and, as a result, conceptual and empirical grasp of these activities within contemporary 
democracy has remained weak. Our conceptual framework presents a significant step forward 
toward resolving this shortcoming. The framework explicates all forms of persuasive activity, rang-
ing from consensual through to non-consensual, and incorporates both non-manipulative and 
manipulative persuasive communication. Most importantly, it provides a systematic conceptualiza-
tion of different forms of persuasive communication including categories of dialogical, non-decep-
tive and deceptive OPC as well as persuasion working in relation to socio-political, economic and 
physical contexts via incentivization and coercion. By adopting this framework, scholars of PR (and 
related fields) and promotional culture can avoid inaccurately presenting all activities they study as 
distinct from propaganda. At the same time, the framework provides propaganda scholars with a 
clear and precise typology of manipulative/propagandistic communication.
The framework set out here can be used to explore the extent to which deception, incentivization 
and coercion form important parts of OPC strategies within contemporary democracies. To the extent 
that these non-consensual persuasive strategies may be in play, serious questions are raised regarding 
whether liberal democracies do, in fact, function properly: a society where citizens are routinely 
incentivized, deceived and coerced by powerful actors is not one that approximates to democratic 
ideals. The framework can be used to analyse more critically supposedly benign and consensual PR 
activities but it should also be applied in order to provide a more thorough-going analysis of all OPC 
activities, especially with an eye toward those that exploit physical, socio-political and economic 
contexts to incentivize or coerce. In particular, it should be used to examine the use of manipulative 
OPC not only by non-elite groups, but also by more powerful actors, such as corporations and states, 
who possess preponderant resources in society. To do so will enable a more comprehensive under-
standing of the ways in which communicative power works across political, economic and military 
realms and society at large. Overall, the framework provides a starting point for evaluating and inte-
grating empirical cases across environmental, economic, military, political and cultural spheres and 
analysing the emerging forms of internet-based OPC including digital propaganda. It thereby pro-
vides a coherent approach to evaluating the health of key aspects of contemporary democracy.
It could be that, having rectified the scholarly blind spot toward manipulative OPC through 
extensive application of this framework and empirical research, we find that OPC in contemporary 
democracy is largely consensual and non-manipulative and thus approximating well to democratic 
ideals. All well and good. Or it might be that our conceptual blind spot regarding deception, incen-
tivization and coercion has left us oblivious to the levels of manipulation at play in contemporary 
society. The current crisis over fake news and propaganda, which is prominent in political debate 
throughout the West, at least offers a prima facie case that the latter might indeed be the case. It is 
important that conceptually grounded and rigorous research is conducted into these activities; our 
conceptual framework provides a basis for such work.
16 Critical Sociology 00(0)
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the anonymous reviewers and editor, David Fasenfest, for feedback on earlier drafts; to Stefanie 
Haueis for both critical evaluation and important contributions to the development of the conceptual frame-
work; to Tom Mills and Narzanin Massoumi for advice and discussions.
Funding
DM: This work was partially supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant 
number ES/K000292/1). This award, RCUK Global Uncertainties Leadership Fellow (2013–2016), was for a 
project titled ‘Understanding and explaining terrorism: Expertise in practice’. It provided support for some 
aspects of the work on this article. This included two writing workshops in Bath and the Understanding 
Conflict conference in Bath in June 2015 at which an earlier version of this article was given.
VB, EH, PR: This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or 
not-for-profit sectors.
ORCID iDs
Vian Bakir  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6828-8384
David Miller  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2408-845X
Piers Robinson  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5076-2335
References
Andrews JR (1969) Confrontation at Columbia: A case study in coercive rhetoric. The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 55(1): 9–16.
Andrews JR (1970) The rhetoric of coercion and persuasion: The Reform Bill of 1832. The Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 56(2): 187–195.
Arendt H (1972) Lying in politics: Reflections on The Pentagon Papers. In: Arendt H Crises of the Republic. 
Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace, 1–47.
Artz BL and Pollack MA (1997) The rhetoric of unconditional surrender: Locating the necessary moment for 
coercion. Communication Studies 48: 159–173.
Bakir V (2013) Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror. Farnham: Ashgate.
Bakir V and McStay A (2018) Fake news and the economy of emotions: Problems, causes, solutions. Digital 
Journalism 6(2): 154–175.
Bohman J and Rehg W (2014) Jürgen Habermas. In: Zalta EN (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Available (accessed 5 December 2017) at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/
Briant EL (2015) Propaganda and Counter-Terrorism. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Carey A (1997) Taking the Risk out of Democracy. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Carney JD and Scheer RK (1980) Fundamentals of Logic. 3rd ed. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Carson TL (2012) Lying and Deception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Channel 4 TV (2004) When Britain went to war. Available (accessed 22 September 2017) at: http://www.
channel4.com/programmes/when-britain-went-to-war/on-demand/36247-001
Chomsky N (1990) The decline of the democratic Ideal. Z Magazine, May. Available (accessed 22 September 
2017) at: https://chomsky.info/199005__/
Cioppa TM (2009) Operation Iraqi Freedom strategic communications analysis and assessment. Media, War 
and Conflict 2(1): 25–45.
Cliffe L, Ramsay M and Bartlett D (2000) The Politics of Lying. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
CNN (2002) Interview with Condoleezza Rice – Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, 8 September 2002. Available 
(accessed 25 March 2018) at: http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html 
Coote A and Lenaghan J (1997) Citizens’ Juries. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
Corner J (2007) Mediated politics, promotional culture and the idea of propaganda. Media, Culture & Society 
29(4): 669–677.
Bakir et al. 17
Davis A (2013) Promotional Cultures: The Rise and Spread of Advertising, Public Relations, Marketing and 
Branding. Cambridge: Polity.
Dearth DH (2002) Shaping the ‘information space’. Journal of Information Warfare 1(3): 1–15.
Doob LW (1950) Goebbels’ principles of propaganda. The Public Opinion Quarterly 14(3): 419–442.
Dooley R (2011) Brainfluence: 100 Ways to Persuade and Convince Consumers with Neuromarketing. 
London: Wiley.
Ellsberg D (2003) Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. London: Penguin.
Ellul J (1965) Propaganda. New York, NY: Knopf.
Fielding N and Cobain I (2011) Revealed: US spy operation that manipulates social media. The Guardian, 
17 March. Available (accessed 15 February 2018) at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/
mar/17/us-spy-operation-social-networks
Friedrich CJ (1943) Issues of informational strategy. Public Opinion Quarterly 7(1): 78–79.
González RJ (2017) Hacking the citizenry? Personality profiling, ‘big data’ and the election of Donald Trump. 
Anthropology Today 33(3): 9–12.
Greenwald G (2014) How covert agents infiltrate the internet to manipulate and deceive. The Intercept, 24 
February. Available (accessed 22 September 2017) at: https://theintercept.com/2014/02/24/jtrig-manip-
ulation/
Greenwald G and Fishman A (2015) Controversial GCHQ unit engaged in domestic law enforcement and 
online propaganda. The Intercept, 22 June. Available (accessed 22 June 2017) at: https://theintercept.
com/2015/06/22/controversial-gchq-unit-domestic-law-enforcement-propaganda/
Grunig J and Hunt T (1984) Managing Public Relations. New York, NY: Rinehart.
Habermas J (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society, trans. McCarthyT. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Hallahan K, Hotlzhausen D, Van Ruler B, et al. (2007) Defining strategic communication. International 
Journal of Strategic Communication 1(1): 3–35.
Hayden C (2016) Public diplomacy: Managing narratives vs. building relations. In: Robinson P, Fröhlich R 
and Seib P (eds) Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security. London: Routledge, 142–155.
Herman ES and Chomsky N (1988) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New 
York, NY: Pantheon.
Herring E and Robinson P (2014) Deception and Britain’s road to war in Iraq. International Journal of 
Contemporary Iraqi Studies 8(2–3): 213–232.
Herring E and Robinson P (2014–15) Report X marks the spot: The British Government’s deceptive dossier 
on Iraq and WMD. Political Science Quarterly 129(4): 551–583.
Jowett GS and O’Donnell VJ (2012) Propaganda and Persuasion. 5th ed. London: SAGE.
Kaplan DS and Dixon L (1996/97) Coerced waiver and coerced consent. Denver University Law Review 74: 
941–956.
Kavanagh D (1995) Election Campaigning. London: Blackwell.
Lasswell H, Casey R and Smith BL (1935) Propaganda and Promotional Activities. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.
Lazarsfeld, P. F., & Merton, R. K. (1943). Studies in radio and film propaganda. Transactions of the New York 
Academy of Sciences 6(2 Series II), 58–74.
Lippman W (1922) Public Opinion. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace.
Louw PE (2003) The ‘war against terrorism’: A public relations challenge for the Pentagon. Gazette 65(3): 
211–230.
Ly K, Mažar N, Zhao M, et al. (2013) A Practitioner’s Guide to Nudging. Toronto: University of Toronto.
Lyotard J-F (1979) The Postmodern Condition, trans. Bennington G and Massumi B. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press.
McStay A (2013) Creativity and Advertising. London: Routledge.
Manheim J (2011) Strategy in Information and Influence Campaigns. London: Routledge.
Marlin R (2013) Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion. 2nd ed. Ontario: Broadview Press.
Martin LJ (1982) Disinformation: An instrumentality in the propaganda arsenal. Political Communication 
2(1): 47–64.
18 Critical Sociology 00(0)
Martinez P (2012) The Consumer Mind: Brand Perception and the Implications for Marketers. London: 
Kogan Page.
Mearsheimer J (2011) Why Leaders Lie. London: Duckworth Overlook.
Metaxas PT and Mustafaraj E (2012) Social media and the elections. Science 338(6106): 472–473.
Michaels D (2008) Doubt is Their Product. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miller D (1994) Don’t Mention the War: Northern Ireland, Propaganda and the Media. London: Pluto Press.
Miller D and Dinan W (2008) A Century of Spin. London: Pluto Press.
Miller, D. (2015). Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations. In Smith, A., Dawson, M., Fowler, B., 
Miller, D. (Eds.). Stretching the Sociological Imagination (pp. 163–188). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Moloney K (2006) Rethinking Public Relations. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
Morrison D (2015) Iraq: Lies, half-truths and omissions on the road to war against Iraq. Open Democracy. 28 
October. Available (accessed 22 September 2017) at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/david-morri-
son/lies-half-truths-and-omissions-on-road-to-war-against-iraq
Oreskes N and Conway EM (2011) Merchants of Doubt. New York, NY: Bloomsbury.
Ratkiewicz J, Conover MD, Meiss M, et al. (2011) Detecting and tracking political abuse in social media. 
In: 5th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, 297–304. Available (accessed 5 
December 2017) at: http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM11/paper/view/2850
Ringsmose J and Borgesen BK (2011) Shaping public attitudes towards the deployment of military power. 
European Security 20(4): 505–528.
Rushkoff D (1999) Coercion: Why We Listen to What ‘They’ Say. New York, NY: Riverhead.
Sheehan N (1971) The Pentagon Papers. New York, NY: Bantam.
Simon H (1972) Persuasion in social conflicts. Speech Monographs 39(4): 227–247.
Simpson C (1994) Science of Coercion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith M and Walsh JI (2013) Do drone strikes degrade al Qaeda? Terrorism and Political Violence 25(2): 
311–327.
Sokolon M (2006) Political Emotions. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.
Solorio T, Hasan R and Mizan M (2013) Sockpuppet detection in wikipedia: A corpus of real-world deceptive 
writing for linking identities. arXiv preprint arXiv:1310.6772.
Taylor M (ed.) (2013) Special issue: Public relations and democracy. Public Relations Review 39(4): 255–416.
Taylor PM (1992) Propaganda from Thucydides to Thatcher: Some problems, perspectives and pitfalls. 
Opening address to the annual conference of the Social History Society of Great Britain. Available 
(accessed 22 September 2017) at: https://www.scribd.com/document/57111621/Propaganda-From-
Thucydides-to-Thatcher
Taylor PM (2002) Perception management and the ‘war’ against terrorism. Journal of Information Warfare 
1(3): 16–29.
Thaler R and Sunstein C (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. London: 
Penguin Books. 
Van Dijk TA (2006) Discourse and manipulation. Discourse and Society 17(2): 359–381.
Watson T (2012) The lobbyists, the Russians, Google and ‘wife beater’. Socialist Unity. 2 January. Available 
(accessed 22 September 2017) at: http://socialistunity.com/the-lobbyists-the-russians-google-and-wife-
beater/
Wernick A (1988) Promotional culture. Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne 
de théorie politique et sociale 12(1–2): 180–201.
Wernick A (1991) Promotional Culture: Advertising and Ideology in Late Capitalism. London: SAGE.
Wernick A (2006) Rebranding Harvard. Theory Culture & Society 23(2–3): 566–567.
Wertheimer A (1987) Coercion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Woolley, S. C., & Howard, P. N. (2017). Computational propaganda worldwide: Executive summary, 
Computational propaganda research project, Working Paper No. 2017.11. Oxford: Oxford University. 
Available (accessed 25 March 2018) http://275rzy1ul4252pt1hv2dqyuf.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Casestudies-ExecutiveSummary-1.pdf
Wroe A (1992) Lives, Lies and the Iran-Contra Affair. London: IB Tauris.
